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From NGOs to banks: 
Does institutional transformation alter the business model of microfinance institutions? 
 
Abstract 
Microfinance, which pledges to provide financial services to people without access to banking, is 
chiefly run by non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Little is known about the extent to which the 
transformation of these NGOs into shareholder-owned and, most often, regulated firms affects the way 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) conduct their business. By applying the event study methodology to 
66 MFIs that have transformed, we quantify the effect that transformation has on the MFIs’ business 
models. Our results suggest that portfolio yield is driven down by 3.9 percentage points due to 
transformation, indicating that clients get more favorable interest rates. At the same time, MFIs are 
able to significantly cut down their operational expenses, of which 1.1 percentage points can be 
attributed to transformation. Other findings include a steep increase in commercial debt leverage and 
deposits, a significant decrease in the fluctuation of funding costs and a sharp rise in average loan size. 
Profitability goes down in the short and medium term, while return on equity is driven up in the 
medium to long run. By exploiting within-MFI data, our approach goes beyond previous studies that 
mainly relied on between-MFI data. Overall, the results suggest that transformed MFIs become an 
attractive environment for investors, potentially encouraging a more profit-seeking behavior among 
transformed MFIs. 
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1. Introduction 
Microfinance pledges to provide financial services to people without any access to banking. At the 
peak of public attention, roughly a decade ago, the microfinance movement was enthusiastically 
embraced by policymakers around the world, whereas in the aftermath of crises in oversaturated 
markets, concerns arose that profit-seeking behavior among microfinance institutions (MFIs) might 
harm their clients rather than benefit them (Dichter and Harper, 2007; Guérin et al, 2015). Today it is 
acknowledged that microfinance can have a positive impact on poor people’s incomes, albeit to a 
lesser extent than previously hoped by many.1 
The global microfinance sector has continued growing regardless, though it has undergone structural 
changes. Initially a purely philanthropic idea, microfinance started out in the 1970s as a not-for-profit 
activity sponsored by donors. However, since PRODEM in Bolivia was transformed into the regulated 
bank BancoSol in 1992, the received wisdom is that MFIs will follow a natural evolutionary process 
and transform from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) into financial institutions (von Pischke, 
1996). While the bulk of MFIs today are still NGOs and heavily depend on subsidies (D’Espallier et 
al., 2013), several NGO-MFIs have already transformed into banks or other kinds of regulated non-
bank financial institutions (NBFIs). Transformed NGO-MFIs include regional leaders such as Banco 
Compartamos in Mexico, Banco FIE in Brazil or Bandhan and SKS in India, which are among the 
largest MFIs in the world.  
The transformation process implies moving to a shareholder ownership structure; and most often it 
also includes becoming subject to prudential regulation by national banking authorities. In this paper 
we investigate how transformation affects an MFI’s business model by focusing on its main cost and 
income components, funding structure, services offered and average loan sizes.  
The arguments for transformation are manifold, including: the importance of becoming independent 
from donors, better access to commercial funding, an improved governance structure and the 
possibility to provide clients with savings accounts (Frank, 2008; Mersland, 2009). However, some 
argue that commercialization and transformation tend to push MFIs away from their mission of 
                                                     
1 A recent series of six in-depth studies on the impact of microfinance in different geographic settings using experimental 
methods, as summarized by Banerjee et al (2015), presents new evidence of the limited impact of microfinance in lifting the 
poor out of poverty in the short to medium term.  
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serving the poor (Dichter and Harper, 2007). For example, studies such as Chahine and Tannir (2010) 
and Wagenaar (2014) suggest that transformed MFIs increase the size of their loans and tend to serve a 
lower percentage of women. 
Our paper aims to make a threefold contribution to the existing empirical literature on MFI 
transformation. First, while the impact on social performance has frequently been studied, we looked 
at the impact of transformation on the overall business model of MFIs. This comprises all the cost and 
income components (the MFIs’ profit function), the decision whether to offer savings products, the 
funding structure of MFIs and the scale of their operations. By investigating the business impact of 
transformation we sought to shed light on the question whether transformation is indeed a useful 
option for MFIs to increase their financial viability, as is often proclaimed. This is a constantly 
relevant concern for an industry that does not regard itself as a “charity”, yet is still largely financed by 
donations. 
Second, the few empirical papers on transformation that are available have mainly exploited between-
MFI information and compared transformed with untransformed organizations. The drawback of such 
an approach is the difficulty in controlling for unobserved differences between transformed and 
untransformed counterparts, especially since transformed MFIs typically make up only a very small 
part of the overall investigated sample. In order to better isolate the effects of transformation, we 
employed an event study methodology relying mainly on within-MFI information. Arguably, this 
methodology is better suited to documenting the changes caused by transformation; it is frequently 
used both in the finance literature (MacKinlay, 1997) and in the development literature (McIntosh et 
al., 2011). 
Third, we went beyond investigating effects at the mean, by looking at trends in variables before and 
after transformation along their distribution. More precisely, we assessed whether different segments 
of the distribution (such as well performing vs. low performing MFIs prior to transformation) were 
affected differently after transformation. 
Three main results stand out of our analysis. Firstly, the results of our study show that nominal 
portfolio yield, a proxy for interest rates charged, fell by 5.9 percentage points (from 39.5% to 33.6%) 
on average after transformation. Correcting for the overall declining trend, we attribute 3.9 percentage 
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points in the decrease of interest rate to transformation itself. This suggests that clients were offered 
more favorable interest rates after transformation. 
Secondly, MFIs achieved substantial efficiency gains after transformation through an average 
reduction in operational costs of almost 10 percentage points, of which we estimate at least 1.1 
percentage points were due to transformation.  
Thirdly, transformation was followed by reduced volatility in funding costs as well as in overall 
profits, indicating that MFIs sought to decrease their operational risks, in part to comply with 
regulations imposing stricter risk management. We noted a boost in debt leverage, which is associated 
with decreasing returns on assets and less operational self-sufficiency, and a rise in return on equity in 
the medium run, which is the most relevant profitability measure from an investor’s point of view. 
Besides, MFIs at the lower end of the self-sustainability scale during their NGO period were able to 
increase their operational self-sufficiency after transformation.  
Further results include a continued growth in the loan portfolio, which is largely financed by a large 
increase in commercial funds whereas donations and subsidized debt go down. The expansion of the 
loan portfolio was a result of both reaching out to more customers and of issuing larger loans on 
average.  
We conjecture that MFIs transform in order to take advantage of economies of scope and scale, and to 
tap into debt and deposit markets. Lower interest rates for clients were achieved by cutting operational 
costs but also by offering larger loans, which may have entailed a potential shift towards wealthier 
clients, such that mission drift cannot be ruled out.  
The remainder of the article is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature on institutional 
transformation in microfinance and the reasons why MFIs transform; Section 3 presents the 
methodology and describes the MFI dataset that was employed; Section 4 reviews the empirical 
results, and Section 5 provides some conclusions. 
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2. Institutional Transformation in Microfinance  
2.1 Transformation as a profound, country-specific process 
Following Fernando (2004) we define MFI transformation as a shift from NGO to shareholder firm. It 
should be noted that this does not bar the NGO from being a shareholder of the transformed MFI. In 
most cases a transformed MFI will also become regulated by national banking authorities. The 
shareholder-owned financial institution may be a regular bank, but also one of several types of NBFIs, 
which are similar to banks but have different limitations to their operations and services.  
This definition seems to be clear-cut; it emphasizes the date on which the NGO status of an MFI 
legally ends and it starts operating as a formal financial institution, typically licensed by national 
banking authorities. In reality, however, transformation is a longer, more complex process that heavily 
depends on country-specific regulations. Thus, while many studies, including ours, consider the 
moment of transformation as a fixed point in time t, it actually requires extensive preparation; 
moreover it causes tensions and changes within the organization, both before and after legal 
transformation takes place. For example, Rosengard et al. (2000) document the transition of the 
formerly largest MFI in Kenya, K-Rep, from an NGO to a regulated financial institution. The authors 
report that the process took five years, from the initial decision in 1994 to obtaining a banking license 
in 1999. They describe the transformation as an “extremely challenging process” involving major 
strategic, operational and regulatory choices.  
Frank (2008) notes that the transformation process impacts upon almost all organizational aspects of 
an MFI, including governance, capital structure, product design and regulatory environment. Hudon 
and Louche (2014), in their study of organizational changes induced by transformation in Kenya and 
Vietnam, observe that transforming MFIs struggle with redefinition of identity, redrawing the 
boundaries of the firm and issues of legitimacy. These challenges arise because MFIs are by nature 
hybrid institutions floating between two institutional logics, namely the social logic of poverty 
alleviation and the commercial logic of becoming self-sustainable (Randøy et al, 2015). Although this 
double bottom-line principle lies at the very heart of microfinance (Armendàriz and Morduch, 2010), 
many researchers doubt whether it is possible to achieve in the long run, and observe a potential trade-
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off between social and financial objectives (Dehejia et al., 2012; Hermes et al., 2011). Other scholars 
believe that it is possible for MFIs to pursue this double logic and achieve success on both fronts 
(Morduch, 2000; Cull et al., 2007; Mersland and Strøm, 2010). What is certain, however, is that 
transformation is a profound process which forces MFIs to rethink their position with respect to both 
the financial and social logics and to strike a new balance between these possibly opposing goals. 
The transformation process depends very much upon the local regulatory context in which it takes 
place. For instance, in Bangladesh, where transformation is subject to the Microfinance Regulatory 
Authority Act of 2006, the licensing statute imposes requirements on all licensed MFIs concerning the 
total loan portfolio, the number of borrowers and loan applications (Khalily et al., 2014). Further, it 
caps annual interest rates and demands strict monitoring procedures. In most countries (but not 
Bangladesh), national banking authorities demand that regulated institutions be either member-based 
(credit unions, savings and credit cooperatives) or shareholder-owned. Since NGOs by definition have 
no owners (Mersland, 2009), most regulators consider them unsuited as banks since neither the 
authorities nor the depositors have any recourse if the bank gets into distress. Mersland (2009) points 
out that a change in ownership type, from NGO to shareholder-owned, will in itself alter the MFI’s 
governance system substantially, and is distinct from the impact of a change in regulation by public 
authorities. 
 
2.2 Why do MFIs transform? 
According to Frank (2008) transformation is driven by three main motives: access to commercial 
funds, product expansion and organizational sustainability. First, to fulfill their mission, i.e. reaching 
as many clients as possible, and to take advantage of economies of scale (Hartarska et al., 2013), MFIs 
generally wish to grow their loan portfolios, which requires access to capital (Périlleux et al., 2012). 
Since NGOs have no owners, they mainly have to rely on donor money and different kinds of 
subsidized funding (Hudon and Traca, 2011; Mersland and Urgeghe, 2013). Transformed MFIs, 
however, can open up to local and international investors and thereby broaden their financing mix. As 
a result, donor funds and subsidized borrowing can be supplemented with debt financing through 
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commercial loans and bonds, as well as equity financing in the form of privately or publicly held 
shares. International investors generally appreciate the increased transparency and mandatory 
reporting requirements that come with transformation into a regulated financial institution.  
Some authors argue that increased access to international commercial funds is in fact a necessary 
precondition to become independent from donor money. According to Funk (2007) for instance, 
USD 30 billion is needed each year to effectively reach the poor through microfinance services, an 
amount almost impossible to raise exclusively through donor funds. Fernando (2004) argues that 
relying on donor money is a risky strategy since the amount of donations depends upon economic 
conditions in donor economies and can therefore be unstable and uncertain. 
The second main reason for transforming is to mobilize savings, something that, in most countries, 
only regulated financial institutions are allowed to do. NGOs typically are only allowed to issue credit; 
they therefore remain “one-legged” credit institutions. Delgado et al. (2015) find that most MFIs enjoy 
economies of scope when holding savings alongside credit provision, and Awan (2009) highlights that 
savings can be a cheaper source of capital for MFIs. For instance, Rashid Bajwa, CEO of the largest 
Pakistani microfinance program, National Rural Support Program (NRSP), noted in an interview that 
“if I borrow from commercial banks I have to pay up to 18 percent,… so deposit taking and thus 
transformation is a need, not a choice” (Awan, 2009).  
Offering savings accounts alongside credit is also important from a demand side perspective. Collins 
et al. (2010) demonstrate that even people with a very low income demand savings products; they 
typically lack safe places to deposit their savings, and often use alternative and informal ways to save. 
Well-designed savings products can help them manage their volatile daily cash flow and smooth their 
consumption. They may serve as a buffer in case of an unexpected income shock, and they can also be 
used to take advantage of economic opportunities. Furthermore, offering formal savings products can 
help overcome behavioral constraints, such as a lack of self-commitment. If savings are available at 
any time, they are easily spent for short-term consumption instead of being husbanded for their 
earmarked purpose (Dupas and Robinson, 2013).  
The third reason to transform can be labeled ‘organizational sustainability’. Some managers of MFIs 
launching the transformation process argue that integration into the formal financial system has 
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allowed many historical microfinance initiatives to survive over time (Mersland, 2011). Partly this is 
because regulators typically require institutions to comply with strict governance rules and also to 
have a long-term strategic plan. In some cases, MFIs may be driven by regulators to transform when 
they become a systemic risk for the sector due to their growth (Hudon and Louche, 2014). Regulation 
also allows for more control and hence better client protection. Therefore, in order to obtain a license, 
NGO-MFIs changing to a shareholder ownership structure install better corporate governance systems, 
improve their management structures and rethink their operational procedures to become more 
efficient. Even though these changes are demanding and require considerable efforts, they usually 
bring organizational stability in the long term. Labie (2001) notes that ineffective governance – mainly 
within NGOs – has led to resounding failures in the microfinance industry.  
To sum up, whether motivated by the possibility of increased access to funding, or the opportunity to 
mobilize savings, or the wish to improve sustainability through regulation and ownership, 
transformation primarily seems to be an answer to an urge to professionalize and grow. This urge 
seems to be a logical response to fierce sectoral competition, both with newcomers and with 
commercial banks that are downscaling their activities towards microfinance2 (Bell et al., 2002; 
Assefa et al., 2013) which, sometimes, is actively supported by government (as for instance in 
Malaysia, Nepal, and Thailand; Hermes et al., 2011).  
 
2.3 Anecdotic empirical evidence concerning the business model of transformed MFIs 
A number of studies analyze specific transformation cases or a sample of transformed MFIs within a 
country-specific setting. Rosengard et al. (2000) document the transformation of K-Rep, the once 
largest Kenyan microfinance program, into a regulated financial institution. Emphasizing the strategic 
and operational challenges faced during the process, the authors highlight the specificities of the 
microfinance business compared to the traditional financial sector and recommend four specific 
regulatory measures for microfinance: first, a higher minimum capital requirement due to higher 
volatility in financial revenue; second, an asset quality evaluation system taking account of the 
                                                     
2 For example, the two largest commercial Ecuadorian banks, Banco de Pichincha and Banco de Guayaquil, have sizeable 
microfinance departments. 
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typically non-traditional nature of collaterals; third, a minimum organizational structure allowing for 
continued proximity and quality of services to clients; fourth, stricter liquidity requirements to counter 
greater exposure to liquidity risk. Further, Rosengard et al (2000) argue that MFIs should be allowed 
to set interest rates freely, and that profitability should be measured in the same way as for other 
financial institutions in terms of return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). All 
recommendations were eventually implemented in 2006 by the State Bank of Kenya. 
Awan (2009) documents the transformation of NRSP, the largest Pakistani microfinance scheme. The 
main recommendations for a smooth transition are a clear management structure, open communication 
and information distribution to both staff and clients, and contingency planning of the process. The 
study also emphasizes the importance of client-relationship building through proximity, openness and 
transparency, and the focus on trust and image.  
Khalily et al. (2014) use stochastic frontier analysis to analyze the efficiency pre- and post- 
transformation of 182 licensed MFIs in Bangladesh. Their main finding is that transformation reduces 
cost-inefficiencies thanks to higher staff productivity and, to a lesser extent, greater operational 
efficiency. They report a reduction in the effective interest rate from around 36% to 27% due to the 
ceiling imposed by regulation, while dependence on subsidies diminished among transformed MFIs. 
Rhyne (2001) provides an interesting overview of the transformation landscape in Bolivia, describing 
how MFIs not used to having owners or regulatory supervisors suddenly find themselves under 
pressure from owners, along with a regulator demanding strict supervision. At the same time the 
author argues that the commercialization process, including NGO transformation, has shaped the 
industry and made Bolivia one of the most advanced microfinance markets.  
Finally, the World Bank-commissioned guidebook by Ledgerwood and White (2006) presents reasons 
why NGO-MFIs ought to consider transforming and how the process should be managed. The book 
shows that transformation impacts most parts of the organization, including the management 
information system (MIS), manuals and processes, internal controls and customer service. It also 
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covers an interesting case study: the transformation of the Ugandan Microfinance Union into Uganda 
Microfinance Limited in 2005.3 
 
2.4 Cross-country empirical evidence of the relation between financial and social performance 
A number of studies investigate how regulatory and ownership status affect both poverty outreach and 
financial sustainability in a cross-country setting. Mersland and Strøm (2008), analyzing a sample of 
132 NGO-MFIs and 68 shareholder firms, find that NGOs are neither more socially-oriented, nor are 
shareholder firms more commercially-oriented, compared with their counterparts. They conclude that 
it is up to policymakers to decide whether NGOs should be allowed to mobilize savings and become 
regulated without changing their ownership status. Hudon and Périlleux (2014) analyze the surplus 
distribution of MFIs and find that NGOs and shareholder-firm MFIs do not allocate their surplus in a 
significantly different way. Looking at the other dimension of transformation, Hartarska and 
Nadolnyak (2007) find that regulation neither affects social performance (measured by outreach), nor 
does it affect financial performance (measured by operational sustainability).  
These studies empirically verify whether and how shareholder-owned (and typically regulated) MFIs 
are different from non-regulated NGOs, but do not take into account any information before and after 
transformation. It is thus difficult to attribute observed differences (or similarities) unambiguously to 
regulation or a change in ownership. Put differently, it is hard to isolate the effect of transformation 
from the effect of other unobserved intergroup differences. Moreover, several shareholder-owned 
MFIs involved in microfinance never actually transformed but started out in their existing 
organizational form.  
A handful of studies single out the effect of transformation on both social and financial indicators by 
either employing information before and after transformation, or by constructing a control group of 
similar untransformed MFIs. The main emphasis of these studies is to verify whether transformation 
leads to mission drift, defined as a shift away from the poor (Woller et al., 1999).  
                                                     
3 Later, in 2008, Uganda Microfinance Limited was acquired by the Kenyan Equity Bank, further illustrating how 
organizational structures in microfinance continue to evolve.  
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Frank (2008) compares 25 transformed MFIs with a control group of 25 untransformed MFIs. The 
main finding is that transformed MFIs expand their client base and loan portfolio, which supports the 
argument that they transform in order to grow and serve more clients. Regarding social performance, 
the study finds a drop in the proportion of female clients and an increase in average loan sizes among 
transformed MFIs. Like Frank (2008), Chahine and Tannir (2010) compare the social and financial 
performance indicators of 68 transformed MFIs with a matched control sample of 68 non-transformed 
MFIs on a year-by-year basis. They find that the transformed institutions have more active borrowers 
than their non-transformed counterparts, but also higher average loan sizes. Wagenaar (2014) goes 
beyond this year-by-year comparison of transformed versus non-transformed MFIs by using a large 
international MFI panel dataset based on the MIX Market. As with the aforementioned studies, she 
finds an increase in average loan size and a decrease in the share of female customers. All of the above 
studies suggest that mission drift may be a result of transformation, which they conclude from an 
increase in average loan sizes and/or a drop in the share of female clients. 
Compared to previous studies, our approach to the effect of transformation is novel: to our knowledge 
we are the first to apply event study methodology in this context. In addition, we investigate how 
transformation influences the MFI’s overall business model, which includes the MFI’s profit function, 
the mix of funding sources and the scope of services provided. Moreover, while the aforementioned 
studies focus on effects in the mean, we study whether effects differ along the distribution of variables.  
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data and summary statistics 
The dataset was mainly gathered through a survey of Fernando (2004), Hishigsuren (2006), Frank 
(2008), a CGAP study by Lauer (2008) and a spreadsheet on legal status transition published by MIX 
Market (www.mixmarket.org). Next, data on transformed MFIs were gathered from the MIX database. 
Additional transformed MFIs were identified manually by screening academic papers, industry notes 
and documents.  
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Table 1 reports summary statistics on the 66 transformed MFIs in the database over the period 1993-
2011 in Panel A and presents a regional distribution of several indicators in Panel B. The influence of 
extreme values is omitted by winsorizing the main variables at the top and bottom 1% of the 
distribution.4 As displayed in Panel A, the median MFI in our sample manages a total loan portfolio of 
USD 7.2 million for around 16,600 borrowers and has been operating for nine years. The average loan 
size is USD 430. The median value for the inflation-adjusted portfolio yield is 23%, while the ROA 
and ROE are 3% and 13%, respectively. Panel B demonstrates that there is substantial heterogeneity 
among MFIs in different regions. For instance, while the average number of borrowers for South 
Asian MFIs is higher than 270,000, Eastern European and Russian MFIs have a mean borrower base 
of only around 8,000. 
 
< Insert Table 1 here > 
As illustrated in the previous sections, the current literature investigates differences between MFIs that 
have not transformed and those that have. Therefore, most studies on transformation identify whether 
MFIs have transformed, but not when the change actually occurred. This could be due to lack of 
longitudinal data or simply to the fact that the time of transformation is not observable. When this is 
the case, one can only employ between-MFI information and analyze how MFIs that have transformed 
at any given time are different from a non-transformed control group. As already mentioned, this 
poses a problem because the differences observed might not be the result of transformation at all, but 
of some other unobserved differences between transformed and non-transformed MFIs.  
This issue is particularly problematic because the sub-sample of transformed MFIs is typically small in 
relation to the overall sample investigated. For instance, Hishigsuren (2006) reports 43 cases of 
transformed MFIs out of thousands of NGOs (status of 2006), while the sample used by Wagenaar 
(2014) contains 59 transformed MFIs (only 5% of the sample) covering the period up to 2010. This 
small share should not, however, be misinterpreted as an indication of the irrelevance of 
transformations. Figure 1 illustrates that the share of transformed MFIs in the global market, measured 
though various indicators, is not negligible. The share of borrowers catered for by transformed MFIs 
                                                     
4 To ensure robustness, we carried out the same set of analyses including extreme values, which did not alter the results. 
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has been rising steadily, up to almost a quarter of the entire market in 2010. Furthermore, transformed 
MFIs employ a significant share of the global microfinance workforce. The number of depositors and 
the share in gross loan portfolio also show a tendency to grow, albeit at a slower pace. 
 
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
 
Figure 1 does not only show the significance of transformations, but also fuels concerns about the 
assumption that the observables of transformed and untransformed MFIs are similar except for 
transformation itself. Unobservable differences between the two groups may well influence the 
entrepreneurial decision whether to transform or not.  
 
3.2 Method: exploiting within-MFI information 
Given that we had enough data points for each transformed MFI, we exploited within-MFI 
information for a sample of transformed MFIs. By doing so, we singled out and quantified the changes 
in the MFI’s business model induced by transformation. Furthermore, we employed an updated 
sample of 66 transformed MFIs over the period 1993-2011. Within this period, all MFIs under 
consideration underwent transformation during a known year t0, changing from the status of an NGO 
to that of a bank or NBFI. 
First, we reported the mean and median values for all variables under consideration pre- and post- 
transformation, and tested the significance of the differences observed. Second, we graphically 
reported the median values and interquartile ranges for variables under consideration in the interval 
[t0-7; t0+7] to observe natural trends in the variables. Further, this enabled us to observe how those 
trends altered around point t0 and whether different segments in the distribution of a variable were 
affected differently. 
Next, we used insights from the event study methodology to isolate the effect of transformation for the 
variables under consideration. The aim was to estimate a normal value for each observation of the 
variables under consideration, using linear prediction based on an underlying regression analysis. In 
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this underlying regression we used the different cost and income drivers as the dependent variable; as 
explanatory variables we used broad MFI-level controls such as MFI size and age, as well as Gross 
National Income (GNI) per capita (in logs and PPP), to take the potential influence of fluctuations in 
the overall economy into account. Furthermore we included MFI fixed effects to control for any time-
constant unobserved difference between the MFIs, including the legal and regulatory system, as well 
as year dummies, to reduce the impact of industry-wide trends and natural patterns over time. With 
each observation, fitted values that could be considered a normal value for a specific MFI in any given 
year and region were computed for the variable under consideration. The difference between the 
actual value and the fitted value then resulted in the abnormal value (or excess value) for a given MFI.  
If we denote by Yi,t the value for the dependent variable of interest for MFI i at year t, let Xi,t be a 
vector of MFI characteristics and let Ti,t ∈{0,1} indicate whether the observed year lies before or after 
the transformation year t0i for a given MFI (that is, Ti,t = 1 if ti > t0i), then our model elaborates as 
follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸�𝑌𝑖,𝑡�𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 0� , where 
𝐸�𝑌𝑖,𝑡�𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 0� = 𝛼𝚤� + 𝜃𝑡� + ?̂?𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾�𝐺𝐺𝐼𝑖,𝑡  if Ti,t = 0 
𝛼𝚤�  indicates the MFI fixed effects and 𝜃𝑡�  the year dummies, while ?̂? and 𝛾� are the point estimates for 
the coefficients of MFI characteristics and per-capita GNI, respectively. The coefficients were derived 
using data points only prior to transformation for each MFI. For each such variable Y we reported the 
actual (Yi,t), fitted (E[Yi,t|Ti,t = 0]) and abnormal (𝑌𝑖,𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) values, averaged over each year relative 
to transformation within the interval [t0; t0+7], thereby assessing the impact of transformation up to 
seven years after the event. Following the procedure outlined in Section 3 (Stages of the analysis), for 
each observation we calculated the predicted value based on the estimated coefficients of the 
regressions, which we labelled the normal value. Next, we calculated the abnormal value for each of 
the transformed observations as the difference between the actual value and normal value of the profit 
driver. Averaging the abnormal values (AV) over the N MFIs for a given t yields the overall annual 
abnormal values: 
𝐴𝐴(𝑡) = 1
𝐺
� 𝐴𝐴𝑖(𝑡)
𝑖
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We also reported the average abnormal value (AAV) over the observed period after transformation 
(T=7) for each variable under study: 
𝐴𝐴𝐴 =  1
𝑇 ∙ 𝐺
� � 𝐴𝐴𝑖(𝑡)
𝑖𝑡
 
 In order to check our results for sensitivity towards the choice of specification, we undertook several 
robustness checks assuming different underlying models. The results of the robustness checks are 
reported in Section 4.5. 
 
4. Main results 
4.1 Results of the underlying event study regressions  
Table 2 depicts the estimates generated by our underlying regression model, presented above in 
Section 3. Since the regressions are based on observations prior to transformation of a given MFI, the 
number of years that enter the estimation varies for each MFI. On average, MFIs transformed nine 
years after their establishment. While 40% of the MFIs in the sample transformed between 2005 and 
2007, the earliest transformation was recorded in 1992. Overall, the regressions cover a period of 18 
years. The MFI characteristics that we considered were total assets (in logs) as a proxy for size, the 
MFI’s age in years and the number of active borrowers (also in logs).5 To circumvent endogeneity 
caused by the asset variable, we used one-period lags. Moreover we included GNI per capita (USD 
adjusted for purchasing power) to control for fluctuations in the overall economy which may affect an 
MFI’s business model.  
Panel A displays the regressions for the four main profit drivers. For each regression we reported the 
R-squared of the mean-deviated regression and labelled this the ‘within R-squared’. Levels vary from 
.076 for the write-off ratio to .475 for operating expenses (Column 4), which indicates a reasonably 
good model fit.  
Panel B contains the regression coefficients for the three profitability indicators: ROE, ROA and 
operational self-sustainability (OSS). The number of borrowers has a highly significant (1% level) and 
                                                     
5 Pearson’s correlation coefficient between number of borrowers (in logs) and total assets (in logs) amounts to 
.67 before transformation, which we do not deem a major caveat as to our specification. 
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positive coefficient in all three specifications. All within R-squared values are satisfactorily high, with 
the ROA specification (.35) standing out. 
 
<Insert table 2 here> 
4.2 Transformation and the main profit drivers  
The following three subsections present a combined analysis of the univariate mean and median 
comparisons, the median and quartile trend analysis derived from the graphs, and the results obtained 
through the event study methodology. To test changes in the means and median for significance, we 
applied 2-tailed t-tests and Pearson chi-square statistics, respectively.  
 
<Insert Table 3 here> 
<Insert Figure 2 here> 
<Insert Table 4 here> 
 
Comparing the median and mean values for portfolio yields shown in Table 3, we found that both 
nominal and real (inflation-adjusted) portfolio yields went down significantly after transformation. 
The median nominal portfolio yield fell from 37% to 30%, while the median real portfolio yield 
declined from 28% to 21%. The graphs in Figure 2 unveil a more nuanced pattern: in fact portfolio 
yield rose between seven and three years prior to transformation, before a steady decline set off in t0-3 
until t0+7. This pattern can be observed across the entire distribution. The results of the event study 
depicted in Table 4 support the conclusion that actual transformation at time t0 reinforces the falling 
trend in portfolio yield. This is true in both nominal and in inflation-adjusted terms. The average 
abnormal value of –3.9 per annum states that, considering all seven years after transformation, the 
observed nominal portfolio yield is on average 3.9 percentage points lower than in a predicted scenario 
without transformation. Similarly, real portfolio yield is on average 6.2 percentage points lower than 
predicted over the same period. Taken together, the results suggest that transformation induces a drop 
in interest rates charged to microborrowers.  
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Turning to the operating expenses ratio, Table 3 shows a significant decrease in operating costs in both 
median (from 24.4% to 16.9%) and mean value (from 31.1% to 21.8%), the differences being 
significant at the 1% level. The graph in Figure 2 confirms the steady decrease. Some interesting 
pattern in the distribution of operating costs emerges from the graphical analysis: after transformation, 
both the median and the upper quartile approach the lower quartile, which mostly remains at the same 
level. Thus seven years after transformation, most MFIs were able to cut back their operating costs 
ratio to similar and low levels, ranging from 11% to 16%. Results of the event study, depicted in Table 
4, show that operating costs were consistently lower after MFIs had transformed, compared to an 
estimated counterfactual situation without transformation. Compared to the drop in yield, the 
transformation-induced reduction in operational costs was lower (1.1 percentage points) though still at 
economically very significant levels. Moreover, the consistency in direction and the relatively high 
within R-squared in the underlying regression (.48) strengthen the validity of the results.  
Turning to funding costs, we observe a significant increase in the median in Table 3, while at the same 
time the mean funding costs fall slightly. This hints at differential trends concerning funding costs 
along the distribution. Indeed, looking at the graph in Figure 2, one can observe different behaviors of 
the upper and lower quartiles of funding costs. The upper quartile exhibits an increasing trend before 
transformation, which is reversed after transformation. The lower quartile, in contrast, mainly 
fluctuates around a steady level, with the exception of the first three post-transformation years, where 
it experiences a temporary increase from 5% to 7%. The event study results presented in Table 4 
complement the univariate analysis, showing that in the interval [t0; t0+7], funding costs are on 
average 4.4 percentage points lower than the predicted values. This is mainly because the predicted 
values had forecasted a strong trend towards increased funding costs after transformation, while actual 
funding costs remained rather at the same level post-transformation. 
We also note that the dispersion of funding costs within MFIs, as measured by the standard deviation 
across years, decreased significantly (at the 5% level) during the observed post-transformation period 
(figures not shown). In combination with the observed insignificant change in the mean funding cost 
(see Table 3), this implies a mean-preserving contraction of the distribution of funding costs after 
transformation. Since a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of a random variable is commonly 
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defined as an increase in risk (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), we understand the observed mean-preserving 
contraction in the distribution of funding costs to be a decrease in the profit risk.  
Another component in the profit function are loan losses, measured by (i.) portfolio at risk after 30 
days and (ii.) the loan write-off ratio. Table 3 shows a significant rise in the mean of portfolio at risk 
(10% level), while the increase in the median is insignificant. Conversely, no significant change in the 
mean write-off ratio can be found, whereas the median falls significantly (10% level). No clear 
tendencies emerge from the graphs in Figure 2, and the upper quartiles especially are very volatile in 
both cases. Regarding the results of the event study in Table 4, we do not observe a meaningful effect 
of transformation on loan losses, either. We therefore concluded that in the medium run, 
transformation did not have any observable effect on the loan losses of MFIs. 
Summarizing the results concerning profit drivers, we found a significant reduction in real and 
nominal portfolio yield, which corresponds to a lowering in interest rates charged to customers. This 
went along with decreased operational costs, especially for MFIs with previously high levels of 
operational costs. The univariate trend in the cost of funds was somewhat ambiguous, but we did 
observe a significant decline in the spread of funding costs after transformation, which translates into a 
decrease in risk linked to funding costs. Finally, loan losses did not seem to be affected by the process 
of transformation. 
4.3 Transformation and overall profitability 
The three main profit indicators considered in this study are return on equity (ROE), return on assets 
(ROA) and operational self-sustainability (OSS), which measures the share of operational costs that 
are covered by an MFIs’ own income.  
Starting with ROA, we did not detect a significant change in the mean as captured by Table 3, while 
the median ROA fell significantly from 4.6 to 2.7. The analysis in Figure 2 indicates that the median 
and upper quartile ROA are decreasing in the long term, though not smoothly. Interestingly, the lower 
quartile stands in contrast to this trend, as it sees its ROA mostly constant or rising, but hardly 
decreasing during the observed period. As with funding costs, described above, the fluctuation in ROA 
after transformation is lower than before transformation. Event study results, shown in Table 4, reveal 
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the constantly negative effects of transformation on ROA (averaging -3.7 percentage points in the 
period t0 to t0+7).  
Regarding ROE, which is a more interesting measure from an investor’s point of view, Table 3 does 
not display any significant changes, neither in the mean nor in the median. Figure 2 reveals that ROE 
experienced a drop one year after transformation, but then followed a relatively stable growth path 
from t=2 onwards. Turning to the event study results in Table 4, we can see that the abnormal values 
were consistently negative in the interval [t0; t0+4], hinting at an initial loss in ROE due to 
transformation. Subsequently however, from t0+5 to t0+7, ROE rocketed, offering returns that were 
higher compared to a scenario without transformation – in the range of 16 to 32 percentage points.  
Turning to OSS, we do not observe any significant change in the median or mean value after 
transformation, as shown in Table 3. The graphical analysis in Figure 2 shows that the median OSS 
did not exhibit an overall trend over the entire period. The drop in OSS observed in the year after 
transformation was offset by an increase three years later. The overall trend in the lower quartile, i.e. 
in the less profitable MFIs, was upward-sloping. After transformation, most MFIs (at least 75%) were 
able to cover their operational costs through their own operational revenue every year, whereas seven 
years prior to transformation, this was the case for only 50% of the sample MFIs. The abnormal values 
in Table 4 suggest that in the first four years after transformation, OSS was substantially lower 
compared to the predicted values. The difference was less stark in the interval [t0+5; t0+7], but 
altogether our results indicate a significant decrease in the MFI’s OSS.  
Taken together, two out of three indicators suggest a negative impact on the average profitability in the 
short to medium run. Previously low-performing MFIs were able to increase their self-sufficiency 
compared to pre-transformation levels. However, investors and shareholders are mainly interested in 
the third indicator, ROE; here we found a strong increase induced by transformation in the medium 
run, approximately five years after transformation. 
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4.4 Debt funding, deposits and mission drift indicators 
Table 5 presents mean and median values before and after transformation for indicators concerning 
debt-financing, subsidized borrowing and donations, portfolio growth, deposits and average loan size. 
Figure 3 plots the median values for the same indicators, again seven years before and after 
transformation. Table 5 indicates that debt leverage sharply increased after transformation, as shown 
by the significant increase in the debt-to-equity ratio in mean and median. At the same time, donations 
and subsidized funds fell significantly. After transformation, at least half of the MFIs neither relied on 
subsidized funds nor on donations of any kind. This is also illustrated by Figure 3, where the opposing 
trends of commercial debt, on the one hand, and subsidized debt plus donations, on the other hand, can 
be observed. Interestingly we see a one-off dip in the mean debt-to-equity ratio in the year of 
transformation, which was probably driven by new equity injections by investors as well as minimum 
equity requirements imposed by the banking regulator in order for the MFI to get a license to operate. 
In subsequent years, however, growth in debt was clearly higher than growth in equity, which is the 
same natural pattern usually observed for banks owned by shareholders.  
Table 5 further demonstrates that the number of depositors increased substantially after 
transformation, on average from 8,241 to 53,117. It also shows that growth in both portfolio and assets 
slowed down significantly after transformation. Figure 3 confirms the long-term increase in the 
number of depositors after transformation, as well as the generally declining trend in asset and 
portfolio growth. Yet growth remained high, and never fell below 25% on average.  
In line with previous empirical findings discussed in Section 2.4, we also found that the average loan 
size increased significantly after transformation, from USD 566 to USD 1,368 on average, as can be 
seen in Table 5. This finding is not altered if average loan size is scaled by GNI per capita. In Figure 3 
we can see that even though loan sizes tended to grow modestly before transformation, they soared in 
the year when MFIs transformed, and in the year after that.  
 
<Insert table 5 here> 
<Insert figure 3 here> 
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4.5 Robustness checks 
As a robustness check of the event study methodology, we computed average abnormal values for 
different underlying regression models, in order to ensure that the results were not driven by the 
specification or a particular set of independent variables. Table 7 shows the average abnormal values 
calculated over our interval of interest [t0; t0+7] for different control regressions. Model 1 is a pooled 
OLS which ignores MFI and time effects, whereas in the second model, those dummies are considered 
exclusively. Model 3 replaces the MFI dummies with country dummies, essentially pooling all MFIs 
within a country. Models 4 and 5 use alternative MFI characteristics as independent variables, 
specifically the regulatory framework (Model 4) and the amount of deposits taken (Model 5). The 
regulatory framework is measured by a dummy indicating whether or not a MFI is regulated.6 
Controlling for deposits as in Model 5 is generally desirable, since they constitute an alternative source 
for debt financing. However, deposits cause endogeneity problems, since they reflect the choice of the 
MFI to collect deposits, which is why we did not include them in the preferred model. Model 6 runs a 
specification similar to the preferred one, but cross-sectionally for each year, such that it produces 
different coefficients for each year. For direct comparison purposes, Column 7 shows the average 
abnormal values obtained through our preferred specification (as shown in Table 4). 
With the exception of ROE, none of the previous findings was challenged by the additional 
specifications. ROE, in contrast, displayed negative average abnormal values in every model, except 
for Model 6. Thus, the initial negative impact on equity profitability after transformation, as 
previously estimated (Table 4), could even outweigh the steep rise experienced thereafter, at least 
taken together over the first seven years after transformation. Our findings concerning ROE should 
thus be interpreted with care. Other findings, notably the decrease in interest rates and in operational 
costs, and the relatively lower ROA and OSS due to transformation, were confirmed by the abnormal 
values computed through the control regressions. 
Furthermore, as a falsification exercise, we compared the annual abnormal values obtained for the 
interval [t0; t0+7] in our preferred estimation model with the annual abnormal values before 
                                                     
6 It should be noted that only five out of the 66 sample MFIs were not regulated. 
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transformation, that is in the interval [t0-7; t0-1].7 For almost all variables we noticed unsystematic 
fluctuations in the annual abnormal values before transformation; generally these values were of less 
magnitude than after transformation. This further confirms that the effects we found can be attributed 
to the transformation event.  
A notable exception in this exercise was ROA, where we found a decreasing trend in abnormal values 
that seemed to begin three years before the legal transformation was actually finalized. We conjecture 
that a decline in profitability already occurred during the planning and preparation stages of 
transformation, which is understandable in light of our description of transformation as a profound and 
time-consuming process. Specifically, this might have been caused by a combination of many 
different adjustments at different levels of the institution (such as: loan officer, client, management or 
investor); these may have added up to a significant overall drop in profitability as early as in the 
preparation phase of transformation. 
 
4.6 Discussion of the results 
We believe that the reduction in portfolio yield is perfectly consistent with the process of 
transformation described above, and this for several reasons. First, when an MFI becomes regulated, it 
can no longer ‘play around’ with mandatory savings, fees, insurance and commissions, which drive up 
the cost of borrowing for clients. Increased transparency, and in some cases also caps on interest rates 
imposed by regulators, lead to a decrease in portfolio yield. Second, expanding MFIs will naturally 
enter new market segments, where they often will experience tougher competition that will push them 
to reduce prices. Likewise, larger loan sizes will reduce MFIs' costs and enable them to lower their 
prices to clients (Rosenberg et al., 2013). In any case, clients eventually benefit from lower interest 
rates, which is considered one of the major challenges in the industry (Hudon and Sandberg, 2013); for 
now we cannot discern whether new or existing clients have benefited most from the decline in 
interest rates. 
                                                     
7 We are thankful to an anonymous referee for raising this point. Tables are not shown here. 
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From a financial perspective the main benefit of transformation seems to be the reduction in 
operational costs. Mersland and Strøm (2014) report that these costs account for more than 60% of an 
MFI’s revenue and are the main challenge in making the microfinance business model sustainable. In 
our sample, operating costs ate up almost 80% of the revenue before transformation, while for funding 
costs this figure amounted to 14%. The net effect of transformation on overall financial viability can 
thus be expected to be positive.  
The reduction in operational costs is also compatible with the process of transformation outlined 
above. Standardization and economies of scale bring economic benefits to MFIs. For instance, 
regulators frequently request the use of a new, or at least better developed Management Information 
System (MIS), allowing for submitting more accurate and more frequent data but also helping MFIs to 
become more efficient. This is an interesting point because it is well-known that being regulated is 
costly for MFIs (Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007; Cull et al, 2011). Growth and professionalization 
also allow for economies of scale, which further brings down operational costs, as illustrated by 
Hartarska et al. (2013).  
Funding costs exhibited differential trends along the distribution. The increase in median financial 
costs for MFIs can be explained by restricted access to subsidized debt, prompting them to turn to 
regular commercial debt markets (Mersland and Urgeghe, 2013). Transformed MFIs that tap into 
commercial lenders on bond markets, for example, experience a rise in their funding cost ratios. The 
reason why we did not observe an increase in upper parts of the distribution is probably that MFIs with 
high funding costs prior to transformation had already tapped into those markets before. Those MFIs 
actually experienced a decline in their funding costs, as they could now take advantage of a larger pool 
of potential debt-financing sources, which allowed for arbitrage. Overall, transformed MFIs, now 
owned by shareholders, may also lose access to various types of subsidies, including grants 
(D’Espallier et al., 2013; Mersland, 2009). In any case, the change in funding costs was outweighed by 
the decrease in operational costs, as mentioned above. 
Reduced variability in funding cost after transformation corresponds to a decrease in the risk that 
surrounds expected profits. Once an MFI has transformed into a shareholder firm, private equity is at 
stake and its shareholders are held liable for potential losses. Keeping costs at a stable level is thus a 
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prudential response to intrinsic revenue risk in the microfinance industry, in particular when 
uncertainties arise due to the expansion of services and operations on a larger scale. In addition, the 
regulatory framework often stipulates improved risk management mechanisms for MFIs.  
Returns on assets and operational self-sufficiency were found to fall after transformation. These results 
should not, however, be interpreted as meaning that transformation leads to lower profits for the MFI’s 
shareholders. Investors are interested in the return on their own capital, that is equity. When MFIs 
grow, they leverage an increasing share of their assets with debt, which will in most cases naturally 
lead to a drop in ROA, and corresponds to the steep rise that we found in the debt-to-equity ratio. 
Likewise, ROE can be higher at lower levels of OSS. We observed that ROE followed the pattern of a 
natural business case: after an initial drop, the investment (in this case, the transformation) started 
paying off through higher returns, even though the initial period in which losses were incurred could 
amount to several years. Our findings might hint that transformed MFIs have a more profit-oriented 
focus, potentially driven by shareholders demanding a return on their investments, or by regulators 
demanding more financially sound banks and NBFIs. Moreover, the fact that MFIs not performing 
strongly prior to transformation were able to improve their performance upon transformation is 
interesting, and once more indicates that regulation and a change in ownership were followed by a 
reduction in profit risk. 
The gradually increasing amount of debt taken on by MFIs is also interesting: it mirrors the leverage 
ratios of traditional banks. Yet, MFIs’ leverage ratios remain much lower than those of traditional 
banks. For instance, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012) analyzed 180,460 banks and found a mean equity of 
USD 0.8 billion and a mean debt of USD 10.7 billion, which makes a debt-to-equity ratio of 13.37. 
The same ratio was 7.05 for MFIs in our sample, seven years after transformation. It will be important 
for future research to ascertain whether stable growth in MFIs’ debt leverage will continue and 
whether it will settle at lower levels than those of traditional banks.  
Regarding the range of services offered, we observe that transformation has enabled many MFIs to 
offer savings products to their clients, in line with the theory of mission expansion (Mersland, 2011). 
At the same time, increased mobilization of savings represents part of the higher debt leverage.  
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In line with previous studies (Chahine and Tannir 2010; Wagenaar 2014; Khalily et al., 2014) we 
found a significant increase in average loan size, both in absolute terms and scaled by GNI per capita. 
Commonly, this is attributed to a drift away from the MFI’s stated mission to primarily serve the poor. 
While this may well be the case, it could also be that MFIs expand their mission (Mersland, 2011) and 
start serving wealthier segments alongside original segments. Likewise, the increased average loan 
size could stem from the fact that transformed MFIs were more able to attract funding and thereby 
give out larger loans to existing clients with a reliable repayment capacity. In any case, more research 
is warranted on the influence that transformation can exercise on the MFI’s mission, and on indicators 
that measure mission drift more persuasively, i.e. going beyond changes in average loan size.  
Naturally, our results hinge upon the validity of the underlying regression model. Like any other non-
experimental study, they run the risk of suffering from omitting variable bias. But the fact that our 
study controlled for time-constant individual MFI characteristics, as well as for the year of observation 
and for economic cycle effects, mitigated that risk. The robustness checks presented in Section 4.5 
indicate that the results are unaffected by various alterations in the underlying models. 
Furthermore, the underlying regression rests on the assumption of linearity in coefficients. This comes 
at the cost of missing out on potential non-linear effects. Another possibility would be to apply non- or 
semi-parametric methods, that do not (or to a lesser extent) rely on distributional assumptions 
regarding random variables. On the other hand, those approaches have other disadvantages, such as 
restrictions in calculating out-of-sample predictions, which is a crucial ingredient of event study 
methodology. Besides, the approach chosen in this study is a mix of parametric methods (the event 
study and t-tests) and nonparametric methods (the quartile trend analysis and median tests). 
While the exploitation of within-MFI data to detect the effects of transformation has the advantage of 
controlling for time-constant unobservables between the MFIs, its shortcoming is that the MFIs under 
study are selected according to the explanatory variable, that is transformation. Put differently, we did 
not have a control group with which we could compare results. Therefore, the question we aimed to 
answer in this study was: “What happens to an MFI’s business model, if the MFI transforms?”.  
Matching transformed MFIs with a control sample based on similarities in observables could 
potentially cope with those shortcomings. However, in our context this entails various problems. For 
 26 
instance, matching in a dynamic panel setting rests on many assumptions that are not easily met (such 
as a common trend), or it has to be performed in a cross-sectional setting, which bears the difficulty of 
aggregating over the panel. Second, matched control sample approaches are suitable to match non-
treated units. Yet, given the profound organizational changes and involvement of various stakeholders 
described in this study, it is difficult to argue that a transformation should be interpreted as a(n) 
(exogenous) treatment; it could even be that the decision itself is what distinguishes transformed from 
untransformed NGO-MFIs. Thus we believe that our approach, exploiting within-MFI data, is more 
suitable for capturing the effects of transformation. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we studied how the business model of MFIs changed when they transformed from NGOs 
into shareholder-owned financial entities. We thereby complement the empirical literature on 
institutional transformation in three ways. First, we have drawn a broader picture of transformation by 
focusing on the entire MFI business model, rather than keeping a narrow focus on social performance 
in terms of average loans and percentage of female clients. By focusing on the components of the 
MFI’s profit function as well as on growth rates, the funding structure, and the expansion in services, 
we obtained a more complete picture of all the organizational changes induced by transformation. 
Further, we were better able to gauge the effect of transformation on financial sustainability. 
Second, the information we used is within-MFI rather than between-MFI, which means that we could 
study the transformation process and the resulting changes in business models in greater detail. We 
believe that this is an important addition to the literature, which has mostly observed differences 
between transformed and untransformed counterparts, thus implicitly assuming that groups are 
perfectly comparable. To this end we applied the event study methodology to 66 transformed MFIs, 
and compared actual and predicted values in order to derive the excess value due to transformation for 
all cost and income components under study.  
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Third, we did not limit the analysis to effects in the mean, but also investigated changes along the 
distribution of the variables. Specifically, we studied the trend in median values as well as in the lower 
and upper quartiles and found differential effects for some variables. 
We noted that annual interest rates charged by MFIs fell by 5.9 percentage points on average (from 
39.5% to 33.6%) after transformation. While interest rates had started to decrease prior to 
transformation, we found that 3.9 percentage points in the reduction could be attributed to 
transformation itself. 
Another main benefit of transformation concerns operational costs. Comparing the seven years after 
transformation with the seven years before, operational costs were pushed down by 9 percentage 
points on average. We estimate that 1.1 percentage points thereof were due to transformation. This 
could however underestimate the overall benefit of transformation in cutting back operational costs, 
since it does not count efficiency gains already achieved through adjustments during the preparatory 
phase prior to transformation. 
Turning to funding and clients, we noted a significant increase in the debt-to-equity ratio and funding 
expenses, a decline in donated funds and a sharp upturn in deposits. To finance the continued growth 
of their portfolios, transformed MFIs increasingly mobilized savings and tended to take on more debt. 
The volatility of their funding costs decreased significantly as the distribution of the funding costs 
contracted. Overall, reduced volatility in the cost of funds can be understood as another benefit 
stemming from transformation. 
Looking at overall financial profitability, we found that transformation had an average negative effect 
on ROA and OSS, due to increased leverage levels. Moreover, MFIs that were initially at the lower 
end of the distribution particularly benefited from increased operational self-sufficiency. We also 
found that the abnormal values for ROE turned positive some years after transformation had taken 
place, suggesting that transformation had driven up returns substantially in the medium to long run, 
providing strong incentives for equity investments in transformed MFIs. In the light of expressed 
concerns about the adverse effects of behavior that has become increasingly profit-seeking in the 
microfinance sector (Bateman, 2010), investigating how this may influence MFIs’ missions is an 
important future research avenue. 
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While our approach – exploiting within-MFI rather than between-MFI variation – has advantages in 
disentangling the effects of transformation, further comparisons between untransformed and 
transformed MFIs should not be dismissed. Notwithstanding the caveats about the application of a 
matched control sample approach that we mentioned earlier, there is some scope for further research to 
elaborate on those methods, particularly if MFIs continue transforming and thus a larger sample 
covering a longer period becomes available. 
Further research is also warranted to analyze more precisely the social impact of transformation on the 
clientele of transformed MFIs and to interpret the significance of increased average loan sizes. A 
higher average loan size could be a sign of mission drift if MFIs stopped serving their historical 
clientele and gravitated towards wealthier clients. However, it could also signal mission fulfillment if 
larger loans were granted to the existing clientele, or if the client base was expanded rather than 
substituted. 
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Tables and figures 
Figure 1. The growing significance of transformed MFIs in the global microfinance market 
(1999-2010) 
Share of MFIs in the global market in percent per year for various indicators. Data obtained from MIX market 
dataset and through own compilation 
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Table 1. Summary stats 
Panel A. Summary statistics for the sample of 66 MFIs observed over the period 1993-2011. To remove the influence of outliers, the following variables were winsorized at 
the top and bottom 1%: portfolio yield nominal, portfolio yield real, operating expense ratio, ROA, ROE, OSS, debt-to-equity ratio, portfolio growth, total assets growth, 
borrowers and donations ratio.   
Variables Definition n mean median min max 
general variables 
      TA total assets in US$'000 713 51,800 9,736 30.074 1,160,000 
Borrowers number of active borrowers 706 100,723 16,626 173 2,811,553 
GLP gross loan portfolio in US$'000 716 41,800 7,254 4.704 961,000 
Age number of years since established 723 9.98 9 1 29 
Average loan average loan balance per borrower in US$ 707 1,031 430 8.00 41,809 
Average loan to GNI per capita average loan balance relative to PPP-adjusted GNI per capita 691 0.24 0.16 0.01 3.30 
Deposits deposit amount in US$'000 681 13,900 0 0 911,000 
Depositors number of depositors 664 34,599 0 0 3,254,913 
Portfolio growth pct growth in gross loan portfolio 648 63.61 41.29 -86.94 500.00 
Total assets growth pct growth in total assets 645 56.66 38.41 -43 402 
Debt-to-equity ratio  ratio of external debt to equity  708 4.358 2.425 0.00 30.00 
 3 
GNI per capita gross national income per capita, PPP-adjusted, in US$ 703 3,900 2,720 610 19,850 
Donations ratio donations as pct. of average liabilities 641 172 0.45 0 10319 
Subsidized debt ratio subsidized funds (difference between financial expenses and market 
rate cost of funds) as pct. of average liabilities 
440 0.54   0 0 7.09 
       
profit drivers and overall profits 
      Portfolio yield (nominal) financial revenues as pct. of GLP 627 35.67 31.67 11.00 90.00 
Portfolio yield (real) nominal portfolio yield corrected for inflation 606 27.24 23.85 1.59 84.00 
Cost of funds financial expenses as pct. of average liabilities 637 8.89 8.01 0.00 97.85 
Operating expense ratio operational costs as pct. of annual average outstanding loan balance 645 25.17 19.71 5.00 95.00 
Par 30 portfolio at risk 30 days in arrears 676 3.24 1.67 0.00 52.10 
Write-off rate written off portfolio as pct. of GLP 594 1.42 0.59 0.00 56.59 
Return on assets (ROA) net operating income as pct. of total assets 644 2.81 3.07 -51.00 25.00 
Return on equity (ROE) net operating income as pct. of equity 643 13.63 13.37 -87.00 95.00 
Operational self-sustainability (OSS) operating revenue as pct. of the sum of financial expense, loan-loss 
provision expense and operating expense   703 117.37  117.63  0.00  200.00 
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Panel B. Regional distribution of key indicators, averaged over MFIs and years  
Region # of MFIs # of borrowers 
Total assets 
growth (in pct.) 
Avg. loan size 
(in US$) 
Age at 
transformation 
Share of MFIs 
offering savings 
Share of 
regulated MFIs 
     
 
  Sub-Saharan Africa  3 33,032 24.6 307 15.7 100% 100% 
East Asia and the Pacific  8 62,689 48.6 432 9.4 100% 100% 
Eastern Europe and Russia  10 8,414 41.5 4233 9.1 10% 90% 
Central Asia  16 12,298 63.4 722 6.3 38% 100% 
Latin America and The Caribbean  14 62,107 30.2 929 12.9 79% 86% 
Middle East and North Africa  1 8,516 48.5 823 5.0 0% 100% 
South Asia  14 274,343 106.9 123 7.3 86% 86% 
 
 
 5 
Table 2. Underlying regressions to derive fitted values for cost and income components, and overall profits 
Panel A. Regressions of the 4 main profit drivers. t-stats given in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Portfolio yield nominal Portfolio yield real Cost of funds ratio Operating expense ratio Par 30 Write-off ratio 
       Independent variables  
Total assets lagged (log) -1.166 -1.443 3.944 -4.669** 0.391 -0.163 
 
(-0.64) (-0.76) (1.53) (-2.14) (0.91) (-0.49) 
Age -3.391*** -3.150*** 1.271 -1.464* 2.435*** 1.366*** 
 
(-4.19) (-3.83) (0.93) (-1.72) (12.16) (6.75) 
# of borrowers (log) 2.688 2.235 -5.928 -4.078 0.00619 -0.0684 
 
(1.58) (1.07) (-1.29) (-1.18) (0.02) (-0.16) 
GNI p.c. PPP (log) -19.98 13.42 -26.88 -24.93 -12.79 5.691 
 
(-0.83) (0.37) (-1.42) (-1.32) (-1.60) (1.33) 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Model statistics        
Within R-squared 0.192 0.143 0.109 0.475 0.095 0.076 
Observations 268 268 275 281 276 254 
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Panel B. Underlying regressions to derive the fitted values as the linear prediction for overall profits.  
 
(7) (8) (9) 
 ROE ROA OSS 
    Independent variables  
Total assets lagged (log) -0.821 1.676 5.959 
 
(-0.14) (0.98) (1.45) 
Age -28.31*** -1.455* -8.515*** 
 
(-7.85) (-1.96) (-3.61) 
# of borrowers (log) 11.23*** 5.199** 10.70** 
 
(2.72) (2.19) (2.46) 
    GNI p.c. PPP (log) 48.67 7.717 31.02 
 
(1.39) (0.58) (0.71) 
 Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Model statistics    
Within R-squared 0.231 0.354 0.277 
Observations 279 280 285 
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Table 3. Profit drivers and overall profitability before and after transformation  
Mean and median values for different profit drivers before and after transformation. Significance of differences 
tested using 2-tailed t-tests for mean values and Pearson χ²-statistics for median values. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
mean values median values 
 before t after t sig.(t-test) before t after t sig. (Pearson χ²) 
       
Income/interest rates 
      Portfolio yield (nominal) 39.53 33.57 -4.42*** 37.06 30.27 15.01*** 
Portfolio yield (real) 30.94 25.12 -4.32*** 28.05 21.87 19.25*** 
Operational costs  
      Operating expense ratio 31.09 21.75 -6.62*** 24.43 16.86 42.09*** 
Financial costs 
      Cost of funds 9.41 8.62 -1.14 6.54 8.50 19.16*** 
Losses 
      Par 30 2.62 3.65 1.52* 1.40 1.95 2.70 
Write-off ratio 1.37 1.45 0.31 0.73 0.54 3.49* 
Overall profitability 
      ROA 2.62 2.92 0.40 4.55 2.72 6.32** 
ROE  14.77 12.98 -0.77 11.81 13.19 0.29 
OSS 115.40 118.73 1.27 118.34 116.79 0.10 
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Figure 2. Trends in profit drivers and overall profitability before and after transformation 
Median values and interquartile ranges for profit drivers and profits in an interval [t0-7; t0+7] around 
transformation. No values are reported for any variable at time t if less than 10 observations at t.  
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Table 4. Actual, fitted and abnormal values for the main profit drivers and profits after 
transformation 
Panel A. Profit drivers after transformation time t0, average per MFI 
Profit driver Values t0 t0+1 t0+2 t0+3 t0+4 t0+5 t0+6 t0+7 mean 
          
 
Income/Interest rates 
         
 
Portfolio yield nominal Actual 37.73 35.46 33.41 34.18 33.22 33.96 31.45 30.04 – 
 
Fitted 36.75 36.58 37.11 37.94 38.13 39.73 38.23 36.08 – 
 
abnormal 0.98 -1.12 -3.7 -3.76 -4.91 -5.77 -6.78 -6.04 -3.89 
          
 
Portfolio yield real Actual 29.93 27.67 24.61 24.54 24.19 24.71 23.49 19.71 – 
 
Fitted 28.76 28.43 29.19 29.68 30.14 33.27 35.37 33.18 – 
 
abnormal 1.17 -0.76 -4.58 -5.14 -5.95 -8.56 -11.88 -13.47 -6.15 
          
 
Operating costs 
         
 
Operating expense ratio Actual 27.62 24.74 22.37 21.36 22.32 20.22 17.94 15.35 – 
 
Fitted 26.59 25.63 25.04 24.27 23.43 21.83 18.13 15.85 – 
 
abnormal 1.03 -0.89 -2.67 -2.91 -1.11 -1.61 -0.19 -0.5 -1.11 
          
 
Funding costs 
         
 
Cost of funds ratio Actual 8.26 9.31 9.04 9.72 8.14 8.3 8.02 8.2 – 
 
Fitted 9.09 10.67 11.26 12.67 13.44 15.44 15.49 15.69 – 
 
abnormal -0.83 -1.36 -2.22 -2.95 -5.3 -7.14 -7.47 -7.49 -4.35 
          
 
Loan losses 
         
 
Par 30 Actual 2.31 2.91 3.5 5.1 5.1 2.66 4.31 2.89 – 
 
Fitted 2.43 2.84 2.75 2.96 3.22 4.3 4.63 5.65 – 
 
abnormal -0.12 0.07 0.75 2.14 1.88 -1.64 -0.32 -2.76 0.00 
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Write-off ratio Actual 1.27 1.11 2.03 1.79 1.62 1.28 0.73 0.92 – 
 
Fitted 1.38 1.47 1.4 1.32 1.36 2.21 3.08 3.55 – 
 
abnormal -0.11 -0.36 0.63 0.47 0.26 -0.93 -2.35 -2.63 -0.63 
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Panel B. Overall profits after transformation time t0, average per MFI 
 
Values t0 t0+1 t0+2 t0+3 t0+4 t0+5 t0+6 t0+7 mean 
Overall profitability 
        
 
ROE Actual 16.05 8.84 7.9 11.34 9.35 19.78 18.91 15.39 – 
 
Fitted 17.13 13.01 14.69 15.5 16.88 3.58 -0.74 -16.96 – 
 
abnormal -1.08 -4.17 -6.79 -4.16 -7.53 16.2 19.65 32.35 5.56 
          
 
ROA Actual 3.13 2.55 2.25 2.35 2.46 4.25 3.8 3.24 – 
 
Fitted 4.18 4.34 4.94 5.88 6.68 7.65 8.78 8.76 – 
 
abnormal -1.05 -1.79 -2.69 -3.53 -4.22 -3.4 -4.98 -5.52 -3.40 
          
 
OSS Actual 124.2 116.75 114.33 114.85 115.27 123.89 124.39 123.54 – 
 
Fitted 127.46 128.31 129.95 132.02 132.88 128.48 130.82 124.79 – 
 
abnormal -3.26 -11.56 -15.62 -17.17 -17.61 -4.59 -6.43 -1.25 -9.69 
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Table 5. Deposits, external debt, growth and average loans before and after transformation   
Mean and median values before and after transformation for variables related to the loan size, use of deposits, 
use of external debt and growth. Significance of differences tested using t-tests for mean values and Pearson χ²-
statistics for median values. *, ** and *** is significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  
  mean values median values 
  before t0  after t0  sig. (t-test) before t0  after t0 sig. (Pearson χ²) 
Funding sources       
debt-to-equity ratio 3.54 4.93 3.03*** 0.97 3.61 122.29*** 
subsidized debt ratio  1.07 0.39 -4.53*** 0.00 0.00 10.13*** 
donations ratio 363.80 31.12 -3.64*** 4.48 0.00 108.64*** 
Deposits       
depositors 8,241 53,117 3.69*** 0.00 97.5 35.01*** 
deposits 135,990 22,753,471 4.33*** 0.00 0.00 90.06*** 
Growth       
portfolio growth 90.87 48.09 -6.31*** 55.57 35.47 14.12*** 
total assets growth 76.56 45.48 -5.37*** 48.67 33.13 15.09*** 
Average loan size       
Avg. loan 566 1368 4.51*** 257 652 53.04*** 
Avg. loan / GNI p.c. 0.17 0.29 5.76*** 0.11 0.20 38.47*** 
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Figure 3. Loan size, use of deposits, use of external debt, and growth before and after transformation 
Panel A. Mean values for debt-to-equity ratio, subsidized debt and donations in an interval [t0-7; t0+7] around transformation.  
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Panel B. Mean values for deposits, percentage growth figures and average loan size in an interval [t0-7; t0+7] around transformation 
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Table 6. Average abnormal values over interval [t0;t0+7] with different underlying regressions 
Panel A. Results of robustness checks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Income / interest rates 
       Portfolio yield nominal -4.16 -7.13 -4.67 -3.77 -6.27 -0.12 -3.89 
Portfolio yield real -5.34 -8.43 -5.99 -4.01 -7.77 0.31 -6.15 
Funding costs       
 Cost of funds ratio -0.20 -1.91 -1.94 -0.25 -2.43 -1.70 -4.35 
Operational costs        
Operating expense ratio 2.04 -5.68 -2.68 -5.67 -6.96 -0.23 -1.11 
Loan losses       
 Par 30 0.72 0.93 0.61 1.34 1.05 0.36 -0.00 
Write-off ratio -0.21 0.38 -0.36 0.42 0.32 -0.28 -0.63 
Overall profits       
 ROE -6.33 -8.70 -8.00 -8.41 -6.61 2.92 5.56 
ROA -6.72 -3.27 -2.37 -0.52 -1.94 -1.99 -3.40 
OSS -19.98 -13.28 -8.50 -5.92 -10.58 -6.76 -9.69 
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Panel B. Overview of regression models used as robustness checks 
* Random effects model, where α i are random MFI effects. The Hausman test for consistency does not reject models for real portfolio yield, cost of funds, operating 
expenses, Par 30, write-off ratio, ROA and OSS (at 5% level) 
** Only for years with a minimum of 10 observations for transformed and untransformed MFIs  
Model # Estimated specification Remarks 
Model 1: Yi,t = α + βXi,t + γGNIi,t + ε i,t   no MFI fixed effects or year dummies 
Model 2: Yi,t = α i + θ t + ε i,t    only MFI fixed effects and year dummies 
Model 3: Yi,t = COUNTRYk + θ t + βXi,t + γGNIi,t + ε i,t  MFI fixed effects replaced by country fixed effects 
Model 4:* Yi,t = α i + θ t + δ REGULATIONi + ε i,t  independent variable: dummy for being regulated 
Model 5: Yi,t = α i + θ t + ξ LOG(DEPOSITS)i,t + ε i,t   independent variable: log deposits 
Model 6:** Yi,t = α i,t + β t Xi,t + γt GNIi,t + ε i,t ,  
 for t ∈ T = {2002, …, 2006} 
separately run for each year t = 2002, …, 2006 
Model 7: Yi,t = α i + θs + βXi,t + γGNIi,t + ε i,t  preferred specification from Table 4 
 
 
